Cuban insurgents established a junta in New York City to raise money, purchase weapons, and wage a propaganda war to sway American public opinion. Conditions in Cuba were grim. The insurgents engaged in a hit-and-run, scorched-earth policy to force the Spanish to leave while the Spanish commander tried to corner the rebels in the eastern end of the island and destroy them.

       After initial failures, Spain in January 1896 sent General Weyler to Cuba. Relentless and brutal, Weyler gave the rebels ten days to lay down their arms. He then put into effect a “reconcentration” policy designed to move the native population into camps and liquidate the rebels’ popular base. Herded into fortified areas, Cubans died by the thousands- -victims of unsanitary conditions, over-crowding, and disease.

       There was a wave of compassion for the insurgents stimulated by the American newspapers. The so-called yellow press printed lurid stories of Spanish atrocities. But yellow journalism did not cause the war. It stemmed from larger conflicts in policies and perceptions between Spain and the United States. Throughout his presidency, Grover Cleveland counseled neutrality, and initially President McKinley, who came into office in March 1897, did the same. But McKinley tilted more toward the insurgents. Before the end of 1897, the new president was criticizing Spain’s “uncivilized and inhumane” conduct. The United States, he made clear, did not contest Spain’s right to fight the rebellion but insisted it be done within humane limits.

       Late in 1897 a change in government in Madrid brought a temporary lull in the crisis. The new government recalled Weyler and agreed to offer the Cubans some form of autonomy. The new initiatives pleased McKinley, though he again warned Spain that it must find a humane end to the rebellion. Then in January 1898 Spanish army officers led riots in Havana against the new autonomy policy and shook the president’s confidence in Madrid’s control over conditions in Cuba.

       McKinley ordered the battleship Maine to Havana to “show the flag” and to evacuate American citizens if necessary. On February 9, 1898, the New York Journal published a private letter stolen from de Lome, the Spanish ambassador in Washington. McKinley was worried about sections of the letter, which revealed Spanish insincerity in the negotiations. De Lome immediately resigned and went home, but the damage was done.

       A few days later, February 15, when an explosion tore through the hull of the Maine, sinking the ship and killing 266 sailors, Americans suspected that Spain was responsible. McKinley cautioned patience, but Americans cried for war.

       In early March 1898, McKinley asked Congress for $50 million in emergency defense appropriations, a request Congress promptly approved. On March 27, McKinley cabled Spain his final terms. He asked Spain to declare an armistice, end the reconcentration policy, and implicitly move toward Cuban independence. The Spanish answer conceded some things, but not, in McKinley’s judgment, the important ones. It made no mention of a true armistice, McKinley’s offer to mediate, or Cuba’s independence.

       Reluctantly McKinley prepared his war message, which Congress heard on April 11, 1898. On April 19, Congress passed a joint resolution declaring Cuba independent and authorizing the president to use the army and navy to expel the Spanish from Cuba. An amendment pledged that the United States had no intention of annexing the island. On April 25, Congress passed a declaration of war, and late that afternoon McKinley signed it.

       Some historians have suggested that McKinley was weak and indecisive in confronting the war hysteria in the country; others have called him a wily manipulator for war and imperial gains. In truth, he was neither. Throughout the Spanish crisis, McKinley pursued a moderate middle course that sought to protect American interests, promote Cuba’s independence, and allow Spain time to adjust to the loss of the remnant of empire.